

Networks Out of Control: Real-World Networks 2



# + Social Network


■ Nodes are people. (Undirected) edges are connections representing friendships, acquaintances, business relationships, etc.

#### ■ Properties:

- (Small) Diameter
- Clustering
- Navigability
- Homophily



#### Clustering and Distance in SW Network



density of shortcuts


Small Diameter





## Small Diameter in Social Networks


- To make our proof easier, consider a variant of WS(n, l,p)
  - Let G be a cylce + a random perfect matching.
  - Call edges in the perfect matching "chords"
- We will show that this network has small diameter!
  - $\log(n) o(1) < diam(G) < \log(n) + \log(\log(n)) + o(1)$

#### + Intuition:











- Intuition: most chords go "far"
- i.e., they find a new vertex, that is sufficiently far from any vertex discovered thus far.

#### ■ Proof:

- Step 1: Look at "short" distances (1/5)log(n), and show that "local chords" are rare i.e., most edges go somewhere new.
- Step 2: Look at "long" distances up to (3/5)log(n), and show that "local chords" are still relatively rare
- Use above to show that expanding from any two vertices, the process "collides" after few steps.



## Small Diameter in Random Graphs


■ Similar results (with similar, but more involved, proofs) hold for G(n,p), G(n,r), and WS(n,k,p).

- $Diam{G(n,p)} = (1 + o(1) log(n) / log(np) a.a.s.$
- Diam $\{G(n,r)\} \in (1-eps, 1+eps) \log(n) / \log(r-1)$  a.a.s.
- AvgDist{WS(n,k,p)} = log(n/k) / log(k) a.a.s.

Homophily

## Homophily

■ We tend to be similar to our friends.



## Homophily

- Can we measure homophily?
  - For two "types", let p be the fraction of type A, and q be the fraction of type B in the network.
  - Select an edge uniformly at random. If there is no homophily:
    - The probability that we selected an A-A edge:
    - The probability that we selected a B-B edge:
    - The probability that we selected a A-B or B-A edge:
- We say that there is homophily if the percentage of A-B or B-A edges is "significantly" less than 2pq.
  - Here we mean statistical significance as some deviation is expected just due to randomness.
  - E.g., in the small example: q = 1/3, p = 2/3, so 2pq = 8/18, but we only observe 5 cross-edges.
  - Can also have *inverse homophily* (or *heterophily*).
  - Easily generalizable to more than two types.

### Homophily and Clustering

- Clustering is the *observed* result of homophily.
  - Take the extreme case where there are no A-B edges.
    - Then A-A edges and B-B edges are naturally more dense -> higher clustering.

#### + Homophily


- Why does it exist?
  - Selection the tendency of people to form friendships with others who are like them.
    - Different scales and levels of intentionality, includes both
      - active selection: becoming friends with a classmate who is also interested in sports, and
      - passive selection: having friends in the same socio-economic class because you live in the same neighborhood.
    - Characteristics Drive Links
  - Social Influence the tendency of people to become more like their friends.
    - For example, learning to ski because your friends already ski.
      - Related to Affiliation Networks and Cascades (future lectures).
    - Links Drive Characteristics

# Homophily

- When is homophily is due to selection vs social influence?
  - It is not possible to tell from a single snapshot of the network must use a *longitudinal study* in which social behaviors and network ties tracked over a long period of time.

■ Allows us to see if behavioral changes occur *before* or *after* a


social tie is formed.




#### + Homophily

- Example studies:
  - Teenager drug use:
    - Selection comparable or greater than social influence!
    - Implications on realistic interventions.
  - Longitudinal study on obesity over 32 years:
    - Found homophily when classify types by obese and non-obese.
      - Social influence comparable or greater than selection!
      - Implications on realistic interventions


# Homophily



+ Homophily







# MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR

#### THOMAS C. SCHELLING


"Before Freakonomics and The Tipping Point, there was Micromotives and Macrobehavior." —BARRY NALEBUFF, coauthor of Thinking Strategically



- There are two *types* of individuals, living in a grid.
- An individual's *neighborhood* consists of the (up to) 8 squares that surround it.

■ An agent is *satisfied* if at least a p fraction of its neighbors are of the same type.


■ Example: p = 50%




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
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
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
■ An agent is *satisfied* if at least a p fraction of its neighbors are of the same type.

- Example: p = 50%
- All dissatisfied neighbors move to a random unoccupied cell.
- Repeat.



- Are there a fixed points?
  - Often) yes (depends on number of blank squares and p).
- Given a fixed point, we can consider its homophily think of each square as a node, with an edge to each of the eight squares surrounding it.
- What kind of fixed points exist with respect to homophily?
  - Has extreme homophily:
    - Segregated (upper and lower triangles)
  - Has no homophily:
    - Integrated (checkered)
- If we initialize randomly, do we converge to a point with high or low homophily?


- Similar results are observed when we modify the rules:
  - An agent is satisfied if at least k neighbors are of its same type (regardless of how many neighbors are not of the same type).
    - More "aggregation" than "segregation", but the end result is the same.
  - Different percentages (or number of) types.
    - Tends to exacerbate segregation/aggregation as "rare" types have to cluster together in order to be satisfied.
- Suggestive conclusions:
  - segregation does not require extreme negative opinions.
  - on the other hand, "positive" in-group behavior can be just as harmful on a large scale as "negative" out-group behavior.
  - before segregation, most individuals were satisfied can incentivize them to not move?




Navigability

#### Social Networks: Small-World

■ [Milgram 1969] experiment to study the *average distance* between two nodes in a social network.



■ Paths are not just short – they can be found!




#### Social Networks: Small-World

- A decentralized routing algorithm takes local (nodelevel) decisions on where to forward a message next based only on
  - the geographic location of the current node and its neighbors,
  - the geographic location of the target node, and
- What do we mean by ``geographic location''?

#### Watts-Strogatz on a Grid

- There are n² nodes arranged in a square grid in R², and we endow the space with the l₁ norm.
  - Nodes know the positions of themselves, the target, and their neighbors.
- Every node v connects to all nodes u such that  $d(u,v) \le r$ .
- Every node has k additional edges connected to uniformly random endpoints u.



# Is Watts-Strogatz on a Grid Navigable?

- Note: the distance between a (randomly selected) source and target is O(n) a.a.s.
- Our goal: Reach the target in  $O(n^{\delta})$  steps for  $\delta << 1$ .
- Our approach:
  - Consider a ball B of nodes within some "short" distance  $n^{\delta}$  to the target.
    - Within the ball, can reach the target in  $n^{\delta}$  steps.
  - Can we reach the ball quickly?
    - Without shortcuts takes  $O(n n^{\delta})$  steps to reach the ball a.a.s.
    - Must make use of shortcuts, in particular, need to show that at least one of the first  $O(n^{\delta})$  nodes has a shortcut to B.

# Is Watts-Strogatz on a Grid Navigable?

- How many vertices are there in B?  $1 + \sum_{i=1}^{n^{\delta}} 4j \le 4n^{2\delta}$
- What is the probability that a vertex v has a shortcut into B?

$$\mathbb{P}[E_{v}] = r \frac{|B|}{n^{2}} \le 4rn^{2\delta - 2}$$


■ What is the probability that any vertex in the first  $t = \lambda n^{\delta}$  steps has a shortcut into B?

$$\mathbb{P}[E = \bigcup_{1 \leq i \leq t} E_{v_i}]$$

- If  $3\delta 2 < 0$  (i.e.,  $\delta < \frac{3}{3}$ ) this probability is vanishing.
- Thus, routing takes (at least!) n<sup>½</sup> steps!

# Distance-Proportional Watts-Strogatz on a Grid

- There are n² nodes arranged in a square grid in R², and we endow the space with the l₁ norm.
- Every node v connects to all nodes u such that  $d(u,v) \le r$ .
- Every node has k additional edges connected i.i.d. to u proportionally to  $d(u,v)^{-\gamma}$  for constant  $\gamma \ge 0$ .



$$\frac{d(u,v)^{-\gamma}}{\sum_{u\neq v}d(u,v)^{-\gamma}}$$

# Is Distance-Proportional Watts-Strogatz Navigable?

- When  $\gamma = 0$ 
  - The model is exactly the original WS model on the grid, so still not navigable!
  - In fact, a similar proof shows it is not navigable for  $\gamma < 2$ ; the number of steps is at least  $n^{\delta}$  for  $\delta = (2 \gamma)/3$ .
- What is the problem?
  - Shortcuts are ``too random"
- What about  $\gamma > 2$ ?

#### +

# Is Distance-Proportional Watts-Strogatz Navigable?

$$\mathbb{P}\big\{d\big(u,v\big) > d\big\} \le$$

■ Let  $E_{vi}$  denote the event that, at step i the vertex  $v_i$  has a shortcut of length at least  $n^{1-\beta}$ , and E the event that this occurs in the first  $\lambda$   $n^{\beta}$  steps.

$$\mathbb{P}[E] \leq \sum_{i=1}^{\lambda n^{\beta}} \mathbb{P}[E_{v_i}]$$

- For this to not be vanishing,  $\beta$  must be at least  $(\gamma-2)/(\gamma-1)$ .
- Thus, the message can at best find shortcuts of distance less than  $n^{1-\beta}$  in the first  $\lambda$   $n^{\beta}$  steps, for a total progress O(n), so at least  $O(n^{\beta})$  steps are required.

- When  $\gamma$  < 2, shortcuts are ``too random''
- When  $\gamma > 2$ , shortcuts are ``too short"
- Is there a sweet-spot at  $\gamma = 2$ ?

- Show constructive proof for r=1 and k=1 (this is the worst case) with steps  $O((\log n)^2)$ .
- At each time step, send to the neighbor that is closest to the target.
  - Note: this always terminates as progress is made at every step, if only through the lattice.

#### ■ Definitions:


- The annuli  $U_j$  is the set of nodes at lattice distance in  $[2^{j+1}, 2^{j+1}]$  from the target.
- The ball  $B_i$  is the union of all  $U_j$  with j < i.
- lacktriangle The algorithm is in phase j when the message is in  $U_j$
- Note: there are at most log n phases.

- Approach: Show that we progress quickly from phase to phase.
- If we are in phase j at node u, then to end the phase, we must pass the model.

  ■ The probability of connecting to  $B_j$  is at least:  $|B_j| \cdot \frac{\max_{v \in B_j} d(u,v)^{-\gamma}}{\sum_{u \neq v} d(u,v)^{-\gamma}}$

$$|B_j| \cdot \frac{\max_{v \in B_j} d(u, v)^{-\gamma}}{\sum_{u \neq v} d(u, v)^{-\gamma}}$$

- The size of  $B_i$ :  $|B_i| \ge 2^{2j-1}$
- The maximum distance:  $\max_{v \in B_i} d(u,v)^{-\gamma} \le 2^{j+1} + 2^j < 2^{j+2}$
- The normalizing constant is:



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
  The probability of connecting to  $B_j$  is at least:  $|B_j| \cdot \frac{\max_{v \in B_j} d(u, v)^{-\gamma}}{\sum_{u \in A} d(u, v)^{-\gamma}}$ we must pass the message to a node in B<sub>i</sub>.


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- The normalizing constant is:  $\sum_{u\neq v} d(u,v)^{-\gamma} \le 4\ln(6n)$

- Therefore, we change phases with probability on the order of 1/log(n).
- In expectation, it takes O(log(n)) steps to change phases, and as we noted before, there are log(n) phases, hence we have an efficient decentralized routing algorithm that requires O((log n)²) steps!

- Navigability:
  - When  $\gamma$  < 2, shortcuts are ``too random''
  - When  $\gamma > 2$ , shortcuts are ``too short''
  - There a sweet-spot at  $\gamma = 2!$
- In general, can have a d-dimensional lattice, and have a similar phase transition at  $\gamma = d$ .
- Can also take other underlying topologies (e.g., see a case for trees in the notes).






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
#### Are real-world networks Navigable?

■ Phase transition at  $\gamma = 1$  with respect to the rank!



distance d





- Does this mean we can reach any target in a social network via decentralized search?
- Attempts to replicate Milgram's experiment have had mixed results.
- In particular, completion rates vary dramatically:
  - Highest for individuals with high social visibility, e.g., professors and journalists.
- In our models, the networks were (effectively) symmetric this need not be the case in general!

