

CS-438

Decentralized Systems

Engineering

Week 11

Anonymous Communication

Motivations:


- political dissidents (in authoritarian regime)
- isolate work & personal
- protect freedoms of speech, association
- voting: ballots are anonymous
- hide criminal activity from law enforcement

Approaches:

- "Natural" anonymity: "feel" of anonymity
- IP addresses, phone numbers, ...
- Proxies, Virtual Private Network (VPN)
weakness: proxy is a centralized, trusted party
 - Alice → VPN conn → Bob
 - Alice → VPN server → Bob
- Multi-hop relaying: MIX-nets, Tor (onion routing)
(David Chaum)
- Dining Cryptographers (DC-nets): information coding
 - Alice → 1 → Bob
 - Alice → 2 → Bob
 - Alice → 3 → Bob
 - Charlie → 1 → Bob
 - Charlie → 2 → Bob
 - Charlie → 3 → Bob
 - Dave → 1 → Bob
 - Dave → 2 → Bob
 - Dave → 3 → Bob


Relaying approaches

- MIX-nets (Chaum): high-latency, delay-tolerant messages ('USENET, Email')




- low trust in each MIX
- traffic analysis resistance
- batching, delays
- low usability/non-interactive

- Onion routing (Tor): low-latency, interactive (web)




- no batching, added delays
- vulnerable to traffic analysis (by adversaries w/ multiple vantage points)

Information coding: Dining Cryptographers (DC-nets)



servers/trustees
("any trustee
at least
is honest")



- Multiple bits? - use larger symbols
- parallel instances
- Anyone can lie - disruption - XOR in random bits
- (re)form different groups,
see which groups "work"
- intersection attack
- "trap" or "blame" mechanisms w/ anonymous scheduling
- Zero-knowledge proofs (Verdict)
- Security: want all-to-all coin sharing
~ $\Theta(n^2)$ - less scalable
- Promise: low-latency DC-nets?
- PriFi (Ludovic Barman et al.)